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IN SEARCH OF EXPLANATIONS FOR INTERLANGUAGE PHENOMENA1 
Introduction 
MARTHA C. PENNINGTON 
University of Hawai'i at Manoa 
In the history of any discipline, vigorous theoretical debates often result 
when investigators propose alternative explanations for a phenomenon. 
Alternative explanations are of much interest in data-based research because 
they require an examination of theoretical underpinnings and therefore often 
lead to significant advances in understanding the phenomenon which is at the 
center of the dispute. A growth in the number of potential explanations for a 
phenomenon and in the frequency with which new explanations are brought 
forth to challenge traditional ones can therefore be seen as a sign of health in a 
young theoretical discipline. 
For some time now, researchers and theoreticians have been laboring to 
find consistent, comprehensive explanations for interlanguage phenomena. 
Developmental explanations are opposed to explanations that involve Ll 
transfer, problem-solving or conscious learning. Explanations which take 
syntactic form or universal grammar as the starting point are opposed to 
explanations that take communicative function or conversational discourse as 
basic. While some have opened the door to a unified theory of language 
learning and language change (L.J. Dickerson 1975, W.B. Dickerson 1976), 
others have concluded that second language learning, especially in the adult 
case, must have a fundamentally different explanation from first language 
learning or language change (Bley-Vroman forthcoming). 
On a formal level, the endeavor to explain interlanguage phenomena 
amounts to a search for the simplest possible theory that accounts for the facts 
of second language learning. Unfortunately, there are no direct routes to this 
goal, and even the goal itself is unclear. For what counts as "simplest," 
"possible," "theory'' and even "fact" is highly debatable. Depending on the 
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investigator's slant on each of these notions, different things will count as 
explanations. Some investigators will be looking for the "truth," i.e., for the 
"true" or "correct'' account. Some will insist on comprehensiveness, i.e., on an 
explanation that accounts for no less than all the facts. Others will be satisfied 
with a plausible account for a relatively small set of observations. 
It is a sign of health in a maturing discipline when theoreticians start to 
analyze their own theories and explanations, and the process by which they are 
derived. We have recently reached this point in SLA (second language 
acquisition) research, as the title and contents of the conference for which this 
paper was written testify. In order for the field to continue to grow in an 
orderly manner, it is essential for researchers and theoreticians to carefully 
weigh the implications of the types of descriptions, models, hypotheses and 
theories that they propose on the basis of their observations. It can no longer be 
considered sufficient (if indeed it ever was) to propose explanations for 
interlanguage phenomena which are not explicitly set into the context of prior 
experimental results and of the larger theoretical discipline. As a corollary, it 
follows that second language investigators must be cautious about overturning 
traditional explanations or building grand theories on the basis of individual 
experiments or small amounts of data. 
This paper offers a meta-perspective on second language theory by 
examining the types of explanations which have currency in the field. It begins 
by a general discussion of the properties of theories, models and explanations, 
providing examples relevant to the study of language, with particular 
reference to phonology. After demonstrating how the meaning of theoretical 
explanations is bound up with their context2, the historical evolution of the 
use of certain widely accepted constructs and specialized terms in SLA is 
examined. It is shown how implicit disagreements or misunderstandings may 
arise from variable use of central terms, e.g., development and acquisition, 
and from different underlying assumptions, e.g., about the nature of language. 
The importance of clarity and consistency in all aspects of theory construction 
is emphasized throughout. The paper concludes with some general reflections 
2 The relativistic, non·fonnalistic perspective on theories of the present paper is reminiscent 
of the discussion in Feyerabend (1965) and Bromberger (1969). It also draws on, though in 
many respects refutes, classical and formalistic accounts of theory construction such as 
Achinstein (1968); Eberle, Kaplan and Montague (1961); Griinbaum (1969); Hempel and 
Oppenheim (1948); Nagel (1969); Scheffler (1963); and Smullyan (1961). 
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on the construction and the evaluation of explanations within theoretical 
disciplines and some specific suggestions for SLA research. 
Stages in Theory-Construction 
The starting point for theoretical discussions is, logically, a 
phenomenon in need of an explanation. A theory is a set of propositions which 
characterize a phenomenon and which provide a basis for developing an 
explanation for the phenomenon. At one level, a theory is simply a set of 
statements describing the observations of a phenomenon which have been 
made up to a point in time. At another level of theory construction, a theory 
describes more abstract properties of a phenomenon which can be inferred 
from observations or from other information available to the theoretician. In 
many of the most interesting cases, the phenomenon which is the object of 
investigation cannot be directly observed-either because it is too large, or too 
diffuse, or too variable, or because it is in some sense "invisible." In moving 
away from descriptions of observables, theoreticians seek to characterize 
deeper, more general and potentially more significant aspects of phenomena. 
A simple representation of the process of theory-construction might look 
like this: 
PHENOMENON t---------EXPLANATION 
J, i i 
OBSERVATION--? DESCRIPTION --?THEORY--? MODEL 
J, J, 
L--------------- PREDICTIONS 
Figure 1: A Simplified Representation of Theory Construction 
Theory-building can be analyzed as a multi-stage process. At the first 
stage (center row of Figure 1)-which possibly does not ever exist in the real 
world-the observer is in a pre-theoretical state. At this stage of theory 
construction, raw data, or observations, are described in observation 
statements, often accompanied by descriptive devices such as graphs and 
tables, and a theory or theories is/ are constructed on the basis of those data. In 
this early stage of investigation, a potential explanation or explanations for the 
phenomenon under investigation can then be generated on the basis of the 
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theory or a derived model. Models may be invoked or constructed to test the 
theory, to help decide among alternative explanations, or to probe the meaning 
of the phenomenon under investigation through analogy and comparison with 
other familiar entities or properties of the world. 
A general theory provides a framework for explaining different types of 
specific observations which investigators have made. Hence a theory can be 
seen as providing the foundation for an explanation. An explanation defines a 
relationship between observations and theoretical constructs, relating 
unfamiliar or abstract entities to familiar terms, descriptions or models. An 
explanation in this sense links the most obvious and concrete aspect of a 
phenomenon, the observations, to the deepest and most abstract level, the 
theory. A theory is therefore at a greater level of abstraction than an 
explanation, and is ontologically and historically prior to an explanation. 
After a theory has been constructed, the theory defines new directions 
for observation, generally codified in hypotheses or predictions which may or 
may not be represented in a formalized model. In the next round, any 
observations that are made are now theoretically grounded, that is, they are 
bound to be both conducted and interpreted in the terms of the theory, often 
causing some redefinition of previously obtained observations. In this way, 
many investigated phenomena end up being constructs or abstractions rather 
than observables. 
While this latter stage of theory-construction may be analytically 
distinguishable from that in which the investigator observes the phenomenon 
with a "pure" and unbiased pre-theoretical state of mind, in reality, the mind 
of the observer is never a tabula rasa. Any human investigator has to observe 
according to pre-existing perceptual schemata, or biases. In this sense, 
researchers are always observing and describing data within the framework of 
a theory, whether or not that theory has been explicitly articulated, and the 
attempt to maintain a clearcut classical distinction between observation terms 
and theoretical terms (Nagel1969, Gri.inbaum 1969) is misguided. 
Clarity is essential for progress in any research endeavor. Implicit 
theoretical biases and hidden assumptions impede progress by undermining 
many types of activities which are at the heart of research. For one thing, 
vagueness or incompleteness of any kind in the reporting of a study makes 
replication difficult. Moreover, these shortcomings may distort findings and 
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lead to misunderstanding of results. Lack of clarity also may be the cause of 
numerous unproductive disputes which turn more on semantics than on 
substance. As we will see below, lack of clarity in underlying assumptions and 
use of terms may cause researchers in second language acquisition to work at 
cross-purposes. 
Models 
A model can be defined as an instantiation of a theory. In other words, a 
model is a theoretically grounded representation of the phenomenon under 
investigation. Models of different types exemplify and substantiate theoretical 
phenomena, generally by focusing on one or another aspect of a particular 
phenomenon: 
A deep philosophical assumption underlying modern science is that 
the complexity of reality can be understood by understanding a 
collection of models-some that describe macroscopic behaviour by 
ignoring detail, others that successively explain increasingly 
microscopic behaviour. Whether this simplifying assumption is entirely 
valid can be debated, but our limited intellectual capacity forces us to 
make it. Without this assumption, we could not cope with the 
complexity surrounding us. (Wulf, Shaw, Hilfinger & Pion 1981: 3) 
A typology of models is outlined below, with examples of each type 
taken from phonology. 
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TYPES OF MODELS PHONOLOGICAL EXAMPLES 
Simple predictive Set of hypotheses predicting future 
experimental observations in the 
development of English /r I 
Interpretive (imagistic) Mathematical model of relationships 
among articulators 
Analogical (physical) Physical models of the vocal tract 
Analogical (imagistic) Wave metaphor as mechanism of sound 
change 
Simulation (physical) Computer synthesized speech 
Simulation (imagistic) Parallel distributed processing (PDP) 
simulation of operation of network of 
phonological relations 
Constructed type (idealized) Cardinal vowel space 
Occurring type (optimal/unmarked) Maximally sonorant vowels or maximally 
closed, voiceless consonants (voiceless 
stops) 
Figure 2. Kinds of Models and Phonological Examples 
A simple predictive model is an attempt to extend a theory's 
observational and explanatory domain by predicting future observations 
according to a set of hypotheses. An interpretive model provides an alternative 
way of representing the entities and relationships of a particular theory, e.g., by 
using the language of mathematics. Interpretive models are often simplified 
representations of complex phenomena. In psychology, for example, the 
description of the complex phenomenon of human learning is approached by 
modelling basic aspects of learning such as habituation and sensitization 
(Hawkins and Kandel 1984) in mathematical systems which have certain 
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properties (Wickens 1982). A mathematical model is a type of imagistic, or 
non-concrete, representation, like a diagram or other type of graphic 
representation. Other kinds of models may have actual physical realizations. 
Analogical models may be physical-e.g., a plastic model of the vocal tract-or 
imagistic-e.g., use of a wave metaphor in describing how sound changes 
propagate through speech communities (Labov, Yaeger and Steiner 1972). 
Physical or mathematical models can be mechanized and so simulate the 
operation of the phenomenon under investigation. Simulations model a 
phenomenon by generating outputs according to the measured or predicted 
properties of that phenomenon. For example, the production of strings of 
phonemes can be simulated through a combined physical and mathematical 
representation of vocalization that is a type of speech synthesis. This type of 
simulation, which aims to replicate speech in its physical aspect, differs from a 
purely imagistic simulation of language such as PDP-parallel distributed 
processing-models (Rumelhart and McClelland 1986) which do not output 
actual vocal sounds. 
Modelling according to types is a way of providing reference points for 
the discussion of entities and systems. In phonology, cardinal vowels located in 
idealized phonetic space provide useful reference points for describing and for 
predicting those vowel systems that actually occur in languages. Actually 
occurring sounds may also serve as models of unmarked or optimal reference 
points on the basis of which less optimal or marked sounds are described. For 
example, [a], which is maximally open and sonorant, can be thought of as the 
unmarked, optimal vowel type, while the voiceless stops [ptk], which are 
maximally closed and non-sonorant, can be thought of as the unmarked, 
optimal consonant types. 
A model helps to relate a theory grounded in a specific observational 
domain to other theories and domains; in this way, a model can help to clarify 
the meaning of a theory and to fully develop its implications. An analogical 
model may help to make an otherwise opaque phenomenon understandable to 
beginning students or non- specialists. A typological model aids in 
conceptualizing the relationships among the items of a system and in 
predicting new items and relationships on the basis of systemic properties. 
Mathematical models and computer simulations based on these can also test a 
theory in a relatively abstract way, by examining the relationships and 
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interactions of quantities and properties under varying conditions such as 
differences in the specifications of the parameters which define the dimensions 
of the model. 
The Delicate Balance between Observation, Theory and Explanation 
The continuing process of theory construction can be thought of as a sort 
of meta-looping in which previously articulated theory affects data collection, 
description and further theory construction and model-building. Disciplines 
very quickly move to this meta-level, in which the discussion is in terms of 
meta-entities rather than observables. In fact, the progress of a discipline is 
intimately tied in with this sort of process, which is represented in Figure 1 as a 
continuous looping. As the theoretical foundation of a field continues to build 
upon itself, the observation, description and explanation of phenomena 
become increasingly interrelated, and in increasingly complex ways. In a very 
short time, newly created theoretical entitities-even observation statements-
become abstract. As a result, any theory can quickly become a "house-of-
cards," in danger of falling apart if the underlying phenomena have been 
imperfectly observed or described. 
Imperfections in observation, description or explanation occur as a result 
of several types of shortcomings. The observations or the description based on 
these may be: 
LIMITED BIASED FORCED FUDGED FANCIFUL 
A theory provides a way of restricting one's universe of inquiry and of 
deriving specific foci for research. While such restrictions are valuable and 
perhaps necessary for productive research, buying into a theory and its 
constructs often creates a kind of "tunnel vision," a narrowing of the field of 
inquiry to a domain too small to be representative of the phenomenon which 
the theory purports to characterize. This is probably the greatest potential 
danger in theory construction: that the researcher purports to be describing 
phenomenon A but is actually describing phenomenon B, a different 
phenomenon all together, or a subset of phenomenon A which does not fully 
represent all the complexity of phenomenon A. 
The sampling of the phenomenon, i.e., the data, may not be 
representative because of limitations in the observations made. This happens in 
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phonology, for example, when the number of subjects is small or when the 
data consist entirely of readings of word lists or passages, which cannot be 
taken to represent natural speech. It also happens that the description of the 
data may be unnecessarily restrictive and so may be considered to 
misrepresent the phenomenon being investigated. For example, Labov's work 
on short-a /ae/ in English (Labov 1966, 1981; Labov, Yaeger and Steiner 1972) 
has been criticized for not categorizing the phenomenon according to a fine 
enough scale (Milroy 1982; Milroy and Milroy 1985; Romaine 1982). Similarly, 
standard, M.I.T.-style feature notation (Chomsky and Halle 1968), in restricting 
the phonologist to only two values of each variable, allows for only a certain 
type and amount of detail in observation and description. Some have argued 
(e.g., Ladefoged 1982) that multi-valued features are needed for accurat~ly 
describing and predicting phonological phenomena. 
The use of a particular kind of descriptive system or set of 
conventions-e.g., in transcribing speech samples-represents a major and 
unavoidable observational and theoretical bias. As Ochs (1979) reminds us, 
transcription is a selective process. The choice of one style of description rather 
than another focuses the researcher's attention on certain aspects of the 
phenomenon under investigation while de-emphasizing or backgrounding 
other aspects. Because of such pre-existing biases, a phenomenon may be 
reported not only incompletely but also incorrectly. 
I have found in my own work on Japanese-English interlanguage a 
number of theoretically significant phenomena which other researchers have 
failed to notice or to transcribe. For example, an interesting developmental 
relationship has begun to emerge between the occurrence of epithetic vowels 
(mid or high central vowels epenthesized, i.e., appended, to consonants in final 
position), pause-filling syllables which might be transcribed as ah and uh, and 
weakly stressed function words (Pennington 1987). Such a relationship could 
never have been noticed if epithetic vowels or pause-filling syllables had been 
excluded from the transcription-as they often are-as unnecessary details, i.e., 
as unsystematic "clutter." 
To take another example, many productions obtained from adult 
Japanese learners that would normally be classified as devoiced final stops 
from the perspective of English or Indo-European transcription are more 
accurately represented as devoiced syllables made up of a voiceless Stop + 
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Vowel sequence. Such a finding has significant implications for discussions of 
the relative importance of developmental phenomena vs. transfer in SLA since 
devoiced syllables are common in Japanese. Reports of widespread final 
devoicing in adult SLA has provided a major source of support for arguments 
asserting developmental parallels to child language acquisition (see, e.g., 
Eckman 1981, Tarone 1978), where final devoicing is said to be common (e.g., 
in Macken and Ferguson 1981). However, it seems that many of the recorded 
instances of devoicing might in fact be technically non-final, in that the 
devoiced consonant is followed by a devoiced (full or epithetic) vowel. If so, 
then the Japanese- English interlanguage devoicing data may have more in 
common with Japanese devoicing rules than with natural processes in child 
phonology. Or, as seems plausible to me, the data may show the combined 
influence of Japanese and natural phonological processes similar to FLA (first 
language acquisition). 
In some cases, the researcher may find that the descriptive system which 
s/he applies to the data does not fit it very well. That is, a particular set of 
descriptive conventions may make it difficult for the researcher to find a 
consistent (or correct) pattern in the data. For example, Anderson's 
(forthcoming) attempts to find regularities of prosodic acquisition in English 
conversational discourse data from Japanese learners were frustrated by his 
use of a widely known English-based system for transcribing stress and 
intonation. When he switched to a Japanese-based system for transcribing 
word-level pitch-accent, some clear patterns began to emerge from the data. 
Eventually, he found that a description of the data in terms of both the English 
stress-accent and the Japanese pitch-accent systems of transcription yielded the 
most consistent and theoretically interesting results. 
While there are some cases in which important facts or theoretically 
interesting observations are missed or distorted, in most cases it is possible to 
argue that different protocols for observation and description are all valid 
ways of categorizing a phenomenon, though each emphasizes a different 
perspective. H researchers are aware that they are placing certain limitations or 
biases on data collection and description, and that these restrictions constrain 
the possible types _of explanation which will be generated, then they can 
deliberately compare and contrast the strengths and weaknesses of different 
theoretical bases and methodological approaches. Unfortunately, investigators 
are often not sufficiently aware of the limitations inherent in their methods and 
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theoretical bases, and so unaware of the restrictions they are placing on 
possible explanations for the phenomenon which they are trying to 
understand. 
In what are presumably a small but recurring number of unusual cases 
in any field, data may be forced to fit certain observational or descriptive 
categories, altered in subtle or not-so-subtle ways (fudged), or even made-up 
(fanciful)-all of this potentially without any conscious intention to do so. 
An interesting example is provided by Trefil (1988). Trefil recounts the 
history of telescopic observations of Mars by scientists such as Percival Lowell, 
who were thought to be meticulous observers of reality and who were held in 
the highest regard by other astronomers. On the basis of his observations of 
Martian canals, Lowell concluded that life must exist on the Red Planet. He 
published his results in 1908 in a book entitled, Mars the Abode of Life. 
In spite of the great care with which he conducted his research, Lowell's 
findings were entirely illusory, as Trefil points out: 
What I wasn't prepared for was the sheer thoroughness of Lowell's 
research ... Lowell, who initiated a major Mars research program at his 
observatory, claimed to have identified no fewer than 522 [canals]. Not 
only that, but he drew detailed maps of their layout on the Martian 
surface .... What is frightening about all this is that Lowell was obviously 
talking about many observations, made over a period of years by highly 
trained and competent observers. All of this elaborate collection of data, 
calculation and conclusion was assembled in spite of the fact that there 
is not a single canal or straight line on the Martian surface! (p. 34) 
A kind of pre-theoretical bias ("wishful thinking"?) had apparently guided 
scientific observation in this case, causing the scientist to "see" and even to 
carefully examine things that simply were not there to be observed. Trefil finds 
this case "frightening" because of its implications in the present-day research 
context: 
If a good scientist like Lowell could be so completely taken in, how 
much of what we do in modern science will someday join the canals of 
Mars as examples of human folly? (p. 36) 
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Some may find this a "quaint" example which has little relevance to 
other fields of investigation such as second language research. Others may 
have an uneasy suspicion that there may be analogous cases in the research 
field within which they work, or at least that such a thing could happen in their 
own field. Trefil believes that neither "hard" sciences nor social sciences are 
immune from this kind of occurrence. We may want to dismiss his fear as an 
overreaction; or we may see it as a correct reaction to an uncommon 
occurrence. At the very least, Trefil's discussion of the Lowell case should put 
those of us who are working to develop second language acquisition as a 
rigorous field of investigation on our guard. Specifically, we must guard 
against developing theories which determine incorrect data. 
Theories are historical entities. A theory has a place in history in that it is 
tied to a particular time and circumstance. Taken out of a unique historical 
context, most theories would not have ever existed. Another way of putting 
this is to remark that a theory is relevant only in the context in which it is 
generated and in fact is made sensible only by that context. Theories widely 
accepted in one age-e.g., the theory of Martian canals-appear ridiculous or 
incomprehensible in another age. This is perhaps the strongest proof that a 
theory is no more (and, what is perhaps more telling, no less) real than 
anything else constructed in the minds of human beings. 
There is another important sense in which a theory is a historical entity. 
A theory is required to account for both the data which has been gathered up 
to a particular point in time-i.e., all available data-and also all future data. 
Another way of putting this is to note that theories are supposed to provide for 
explanations and predictions of phenomena. 
It follows that theories should comprehend the greatest possible amount 
of data, i.e., they should be as general as possible. At the same time as a theory 
should be maximally general, theories are domain-specific. A viable theory 
must both account for the available data and predict the characteristics of 
future data in the same domain. If certain phenomena do not appear to be 
explained or predicted under a certain theory, one might simply decide that 
they are drawn from an incorrect domain, i.e., a domain other than the one 
addressed by the particular theory. For example, one second language 
researcher might contend that certain data are drawn not from language per se, 
but from the larger domain of communication; or from discourse rather than 
from grammar. A theory should, however, be both inclusive and exclusive in 
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the sense of making explicit what is as well as what is not in its domain. 
Generality is a desirable characteristic of a theory. As a rule, we can say 
that the more general a theory is, the better, in that a general theory forms the 
basis for comprehensive explanations of phenomena. However, a general 
theory must be relatable to particular observations, either through induction or 
deduction. While a theory may be at least partially deductive, i.e., not data-
based, it must be data-testable. 
Simplicity is also a desirable characteristic of a theory. If a theory is 
complex, the lack of simplicity implies that the broadest possible 
generalization, the underlying principle, has not been uncovered. On the other 
hand, one can argue that a particular theory or principle is too simple, in the 
sense of being a superficial property of the investigated phenomenon or in the 
sense of not having been derived from enough cases. When this happens, the 
investigator must often search for a deeper underlying generalization by re-
examining data already collected or by collecting a larger sample. 
Ultimately, a research field is seeking a maximally general and elegantly 
simple theory, i.e., one which accounts for the most data and which does so in 
the most direct and economical fashion possible. The property of elegance is 
not only a requirement for comprehensibility and aesthetics, but also relates to 
internal consistency and parsimony. In other words, elegance is itself an 
independent test of a theory's validity. If, as stated by Lass (1980: 3), 
"(e]xplanation by law applies to objects in the natural world, (and not to] 
cultures and their artefacts (like languages)," then elegance becomes an 
expecially important attribute of SL theorizing. 
Often, the elegance of a theory can be said to cause it to make certain 
predictions. For example, the symmetrical properties of mathematical group 
theory as applied in physics made predictions about certain subatomic 
particles that were later discovered to exist in other than a mathematical sense. 
In phonology, Crothers (1978) has shown how principles of symmetry can 
yield descriptions of vowel systems from a specification of number of 
phonemes. 
There is a sort of trade-off between elegance and simplicity of theory, on 
the one hand, and complexity of explanation, on the other, i.e., of statements 
establishing the relationship between theory and data: 
Insofar as we succeed in finding unifying principles that are deeper, 
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simpler and more natural, we can expect that the complexity of 
argument explaining why the facts are such-and-such will increase, as 
valid (or, in the real world, partially valid) generalizations and 
observations are reduced to more abstract principles. But this form of 
complexity is a positive merit of an explanatory theory, one to be valued 
and not to be regarded as a defect in it. It is a concomitant of what 
Moravcsik (1980) calls "deep" as opposed to "shallow' theories of mind, 
and is an indication of success in developing such theories. It is 
important to distinguish clearly between complexity of theory and 
complexity of argument, the latter tending to increase as theory 
becomes less complex in the intuitive sense. (Chomsky 1981: 15) 
Thus, a theory cannot be criticized for seeming intuitively obvious or 
simple. On the other hand, what passes for an elegantly simple theory may just 
as well be a simplistic one, risking vacuity. It often happens that the cause and 
effect relations are too specific, or too simple-e.g., they do not take account of 
enough factors, or proximate or immediate causes are considered identical to 
root causes. In some cases, the wrong factors as either cause or effect or both 
are adduced, or the relationship is reversed. 
As an example, many have taken for granted the notion that transfer is 
causally related to adult second language acquisition in a very obvious way. 
However, the phenomenon of transfer and the ways it may operate in second 
language acquisition seem to be potentially quite complex. Even to claim that 
transfer causes transfer errors, and developmental phenomena cause 
developmental errors (Major 1987)-which on first view seems patently 
obvious and even tautological-is dangerously circular and possibly incorrect. 
It is not impossible to imagine that transfer causes or initiates certain types of 
developmental errors, or to put it a different way, affects the operation of 
certain developmental processes in interlanguage. It is also conceivable that 
some developmental processes set up the conditions for certain kinds of 
transfer. The causality of transfer and developmental processes may thus be 
two-way and cyclic rather than sequential and one-way: For beginning 
learners, transfer feeds acquisition, i.e., developmental processes; as acquisition 
increases, the opportunities for transfer increase (Anderson 1983), i.e., 
developmental processes in at least some cases feed rather than bleed the 
process of transfer; and these increasing opportunities for transfer in tum again 
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enhance the acquisition process. 
Competing Theories, Models and Explanations in SLA 
Two theories compete when they both purport to characterize the same 
phenomenon. Two sets of propositions which purport to characterize the same 
phenomenon and which are not mutually incompatible are necessarily either 
(1) not both applicable in the same universe of discourse or (2) not both 
theories. In other words, they cannot both account for the same phenomenon. 
In the former case, one set of propositions may characterize a related but not 
identical phenomenon, or may form a subset of the other set of propositions. In 
the latter case, one set of propositions may not be comprehensive enough to 
count as a theory. 
Research disciplines often develop their theoretical base through 
elaborating competing explanations for phenomena which are of interest to 
that discipline. This process of elaboration, which generally takes place over a 
period of many years, helps to set different theories in sharper relief against 
one another and to generate a variety of models to test aspects of the theories. 
Two explanations compete when they both might logically account for the 
same phenomenon. Sometimes, it turns out that both types of explanation can 
be valid but for different aspects of the phenomenon. One explanation holds 
for one part of the data, and the other for another part. In such cases, the two 
types of explanations may be part of a larger model or theory in which the two 
kinds of explanation are explicitly related. Thus, competing explanations may 
cause investigators to look for a broader generalization or higher level of 
abstraction within which the two explanations may be complementary. 
Two competing explanations often form two poles within one theory, 
dividing the universe of discourse into two analytically or definitionally 
opposite categories, e.g., acquisition vs. learning in the sense of Krashen (1981, 
1982, 1985). In many cases, one of the constructs is historically prior to the 
other, the second having been developed to solve some of the problems arising 
from the restricted view of the universe associated with the first term. 
Theoreticians often argue as though the alternatives represent mutually 
exclusive choices, i.e., competing theories, only one of which can account for a 
given phenomenon. In reality, the truth often lies between the two poles, or is a 
combination of the two alternatives. 
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In the historical development of theories, compromise positions often 
arise after some period of ascendency of one explanation followed by a period 
in which two or more explanations are developed as competitors (Kuhn 1970). 
Thus, it is a sign of theoretical advancement when an explanation for a 
phenomenon invokes interaction of two factors previously viewed as 
competitive and mutually exclusive. For example, models of second language 
phonology stressing the importance of developmental processes (Macken and 
Ferguson 1981, Wode 1976) arose in reaction to strict transfer accounts (Briere 
1966); aspects of these accounts were soon incorporated into "interactionist" 
explanations involving both transfer and developmental processes (Tarone 
1978; Hecht and Mulford 1982). The most recent and sophisticated of these 
transfer-cum-development explanations is Major's (1987) Ontogeny Model of 
second language phonology. 
According to Major's (1987: 103) model: 
At an early stage of acquisition, interference processes predominate 
at the expense of developmental processes, which gradually increase 
and then decrease over time. The reason developmental processes do 
not operate with a high frequency at early stages is that interference 
processes prevent developmental processes from surfacing. As 
interference is eliminated, developmental processes can blossom. 
Bley-Vroman's (forthcoming) model of adult language learning as in 
essential respects more like problem-solving than like first language 
acquisition appears to be a reaction to the learning/ acquisition duality and to 
extreme nativist explanations. Felix's (1985) cognitive competition model is an 
attempt to fit both developmental and non-developmental phenomena under 
one theoretical umbrella and perhaps to salvage some aspects of the Monitor 
Model. According to Felix's model, adult language learning shows evidence of 
competition between problem-solving and language acquisition capacities. 
Models derived from the same theory may be variants of each other, and 
so not competitive as representations of a phenomenon. In some cases, one 
model may be wholly or partially included in another, i.e., the models intersect 
or stand in a subset relation to each other. Competing models do not always 
derive from competing theories. Sometimes two models of the same 
phenomenon are competitors in the sense that one characterizes the properties 
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of that phenomenon better than the other-e.g., by generating a more 
consistent set of predicted observations. Different models may be applicable on 
different conceptual levels. Since a model characterizes the properties of a 
theory in a simplified or abstract form, or in a representation brought to bear 
on a particular body of research from another sphere, it is common for two 
models to represent different aspects of a phenomenon, or to model a 
phenomenon in quite different ways. Thus, two models of a given 
phenomenon may not be entirely comparable and so not necessarily open to 
evaluation by a consistent set of criteria. 
For example, it is not clear to what extent a parameter-setting model of 
language acquisition is comparable to, and thus able to be evaluated in the 
same terms as, other models of language acquisition (Bley-Vroman and 
Chaudron 1988). This is because the process of SLA, particularly in the adult 
case, seems to be in some important respects gradual in a way that FLA may 
not be. Hence the mechanism for resetting a parameter-if, indeed, parameters 
are reset in SLA-may not be the same as the mechanism for setting a 
parameter originally in child language. 
As another example, the wave model of acquisition of second language 
phonology (Dickerson 1976) is not obviously comparable to Major's (1987) 
Ontogeny Model. Dickerson's model stresses the systematic variability of 
interlanguage phonology and its progress toward target phonological 
productions over time; Major focuses on the differing influence of transfer 
(interference) and developmental processes in the course of second language 
acquisition. While the two models are intended to be representations of the 
same type of (variable) data and are both concerned with intermediate stages 
of language acquisition, i.e., with interlanguage, it is not clear whether they 
should be considered to be competing or complementary representations of the 
process of acquiring a second language phonology. While he refers to 
Dickerson's work in discussing his own model, Major does not explicitly 
challenge or build on the earlier model. 
It will be valuable in the future for the relationship between these two 
models to be clarified, particularly with respect to the important question of 
the degree to which the learner's approach to target phonological forms is via 
phonetic diffusion or lexical diffusion. This question in phonology is part of 
the larger question of the extent to which modifications of the interlanguage 
system operate by rule or by item. Flege (1980, 1981) has found dear evidence 
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of a type of phonetic diffusion in SLA. Hammarberg's (1984) discussion of the 
acquisition of Swedish sounds by adult second language learners shows 
evidence of learning based on phonetic principles, but only for those words 
which had no near counterpart in the native language. Those words which 
were similar to native language words tended to be pronounced according to a 
different, transfer-based strategy-in a sense a kind of lexical strategy. 
Pennington (1988) found evidence of the operation of natural phonological 
processes, Ll phonological processes, and other types of gradual phonetic 
diffusion in the acquisition of English short-a by Japanese learners, along with 
the operation of some special constraints for certain lexical items. In addition, 
Pennington (1987) presented evidence for higher level morphological, 
pragmatic and grammatical influences on the acquisition of some aspects of 
English phonology by the Japanese learners. 
Major's model, like other earlier models employing the construct of 
development, posits a strong parallel with FLA. Thus, his model is intended 
not as merely analogical to FLA developmental theory. Rather, the model 
includes an interpretive representation of the construct of development for 
SLA. As will be discussed below, however, the evidence for a close parallel to 
development in child language acquisition may not be strong. Hence, Major's 
model may be better seen as analogical rather than as an approach to a grand 
unified theory of LA (language acquisition) linking together FLA and SLA. 
Getting Clear on Terms and Concepts in SLA Research 
Theories are context-bound in the sense of being tied to a particular 
discipline. The theoretical base of a discipline develops specialized terms 
describing the constructs and properties of the domain of inquiry. It is crucial 
for the terms to be precisely defined and consistently and carefully used by all 
who enter into the same theoretical arena. Otherwise, terminological problems 
may obscure real issues, and vague constructs may masquerade as 
explanations, models or theories. H the terms of a theory are not used in a 
precise and consistent way, those terms are likely to take on a more general 
meaning than may have originally been intended. And the more a term 
becomes a "household word" and takes on a "garden variety" meaning, the 
more it is likely to engender confusion in the field and to end up being 
theoretically vacuous. 
While the opposition of learning and acquisition is intuitively appealing 
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and on first glance may seem to be an approach to an elegant theory, the term 
acquisition as used by Krashen and Terrell (Krashen 1981, 1982, 1985; Krashen 
and Terrell 1983; Terrell 1987) has more than one sense, causing imprecision of 
discussion and confusion among those trying to explain second language 
acquisition. These authors use acquisition in three senses: (1) the non-
deliberate activity of processing input in the second language, as when 
speaking of acquisition activities vs. learning activities; (2) the goal-directed 
process leading up to the goal of internalizing a linguistic system, as when a 
speaker is said to be acquiring English, or the English tense system; and (3) the 
finished state of having internalized a language or a specific part of it, as when 
a certain morpheme is said to be acquired before another one. Sometimes 
Krashen and Terrell seem to be thinking of acquisition in only one of these 
senses; in other cases, they could easily be interpreted to mean all three senses 
simultaneously, or to be referring to acquisition vaguely, i.e., without any 
specific idea in mind (see Gregg 1984 for further criticisms). 
The use of acquisition as an accomplishment term rather than a simple 
activity term (Vendler 1967), and in its perfective or completive sense, implies 
that there is a particular entity which is acquired at a certain point in time once 
and for all. It implies that acquisition has an end point that can be recognized 
and therefore specified in advance. This implication in turn belies the 
underlying theory of language that is presupposed in Krashen's work, as we 
will see below. Interestingly, nothing logically prevents acquisition in the 
completive sense from being accomplished not only through acquisition in the 
sense of (1), but also through learning in the Krashen-Terrell sense. It is almost 
certain that Krashen does not fully intend these implications; nevertheless, they 
dearly follow from the use of acquisition in his and Terrell's statements. Thus, 
an unclear use of terminology causes the theoretician to unwittingly imply 
conclusions with which he himself would not agree. 
In the generation of explanations for new findings, sometimes terms and 
concepts are borrowed from other fields and imported into a new field, in the 
attempt to relate the phenomenon to other familiar and perhaps better 
understood phenomena. Generally, a term or concept is taken over into the 
new field with a meaning altered somewhat to fit the new context. At any rate, 
once imported into a new context, a term is likely to develop new associations 
and so gradually change its meaning. The exact denotative meaning of a term 
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in one discipline seems rarely to be applicable in a different discipline; 
moreover, the exact meaning of the term is unlikely to be knoWn by t~ose not 
working within that same specific field of inquiry. 
As a result, when terms originating in one field are imported into 
another field, they are usually to be more broadly understood than in the 
exporting discipline. Terms used to describe or explain phenomena in the 
borrowing discipline are often in fact borrowed as metaphors, and 
explanations based on imported terms should therefore be viewed as 
potentially metaphorical. Of course, there is always the danger that the 
metaphor will be taken literally, or that the terms as used in the borrowing 
disicipline will carry over connotations and implications of the other field. 
An example is the use of the term developmental in second language 
studies. On the face of it, the term appears quite vague and so to be 
semantically highly flexible. At the same time, the fact that the term is 
borrowed from studies of child language acquisition means that it has 
connotations of naturalness, innateness, and universal grammar or 
phonological processes. In the context of adult SLA, the term development 
may be associated with those changes within interlanguage w!lich follow a 
"natural" path, whether or not they have any counterparts in FLA. 
Within SLA, development has also taken on new connotations, in being 
opposed to transfer as an explanatory mechanism of second language 
acquisition. In the context of this opposition, development is coming to be 
used to describe any mode of language acquisition which is not transfer, 
whether or not an explicit argument is made for its being developmental in 
nature. We can thus end up with forms of development-i.e., acquisition 
paths-in adult SLA which are "developmental" and "non-developmental"-
i.e., the same as or different from FLA. 
Discussions of vowel epenthesis in second language acquisition 
exemplify differing senses of development. Major (1987) argues that schwa 
paragoge (epithetic schwa) is developmental in the sense of having a parallel in 
FLA and also in the sense of following a certain path in SLA. The parallel with 
FLA is hard to discern. I am aware of no FLA studies showing that children 
develop vowel epenthesis in circumstances identical to, or even analogous to, 
those in which adults do.3 In fact, Sato. (1984) and Riney (1987) present 
3 In studies of child language acquisition, Labov and Labov (1978) and Peters (1983) describe 
vowels as being used indexically and as fillers or place-holders, but these cases do not seem 
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evidence that vowel epenthesis of the type described by Major is essentially an 
adult phenomenon. Eckman (1981) describes it as a result of a "language 
contact situation," i.e., as a phenomenon that is absolutely different from first 
language developmental processes. 
If schwa epenthesis is a common process in adult second language 
development but does not occur in child language development, then we have 
two choices. One choice is to tie together the two senses of development under 
a broader generalization, e.g., by describing them both as information-
processing strategies. The other solution is to accentuate the differences 
between the two types of developmental processes, those of the child and those 
of the adult, arguing that SLA is fundamentally different from FLA, at least in 
certain respects. This is the course that Bley-Vroman (forthcoming), for 
example, has taken (though not based on this particular set of data), arguing 
that adult language development looks more like general problem-solving than 
like child language development. In either case, new terms will be necessary to 
precisely define the similarities and the differences in the two cases, i.e., child 
and adult learning. 
Some elegant theories or forms of explanation and the constructs which 
are part of them are metaphorical entities. While notions such as charm and 
color in physics can be useful for conceptualizing a complex system of 
interrelations, there is the ever-present danger of their "charming" the 
physicist into a distorted sense of reality or of "coloring" the physicist's world 
view. Metaphorical constructs can blind theorists and researchers to other 
competing-and potentially better-constructs, explanations and theories. 
It is essential to know when we are talking about observables and when 
we are talking about constructs, abstractions or metaphorical entities. 
Sometimes, the level of abstraction that is intended is not clear. For example, in 
comparing the phenomenon of adult vowel epenthesis to child language 
development, it is not clear exactly what observations Major (1987) intends to 
be compared. In describing adult language learning as problem-solving (Bley-
Vroman forthcoming) or as a competition between adult problem-solving and 
universal grammar (Felix 1985), the degree of abstraction from the literal 
meaning of the terms problem-solving and competition is not entirely clear. In 
describing acquisition of second language phonology as a wave mechanism, 
Dickerson (1976) is apparently speaking quite metaphorically (whether 
analogous to the cases of schwa paragoge in adult SLA as described by Major (1987). 
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intentionally or unintentionally) since he does not make a serious attempt to 
describe the mechanism and how it works-e.g., why one phonological 
environment induces a targetlike variant before another. 
Chomsky clearly takes parameter-setting as an abstract term, i.e., a 
construct, though he believes this to be less abstract than other approaches to 
the description of language (see discussion below). It is not at all clear whether 
other researchers, e.g., Flynn (1987), are using parameter-setting on the same 
level of abstraction (Bley-Vroman and Chaudron 1988). 
SLA and Theories of Language 
Underlying any model or explanation for second language acquisition is 
a theory of language, whether or not explicitly articulated. Language may be 
conceptualized as primarily a pre-existing cognitive structure, as a product of 
acquisition, or as a process of communication. Grammar may be viewed as a 
simplified interpretive model of language or of communication, just as a 
"smoothed out'' universe is a model of the real universe in which we live. 
Language functionalists see grammar as only part of the relevant phenomenon 
to be accounted for and not a model of that phenomenon because it does not 
represent the total phenomenon, i.e., its domain is too restrictive. However, 
some linguists see grammar as the essential phenomenon, and not necessarily 
as a model for some larger phenomenon which we might call communication. 
While acquisition is viewed as both process and product in Krashen's 
work, language is always described in product terms. From his participation in 
and sympathy towards the morpheme order studies (Bailey, Madden and 
Krashen, 1974; Dulay, Burt and Krashen, 1982), Krashen shows clearly that he 
is thinking of language as a discrete set of items, each of which is internalized 
at a certain point in time. This view represents a relatively narrow focus on 
grammatical forms as the heart of language. 
One can argue against a Krashen-Terrell view of acquisition of language 
by noting that neither a native nor a nonnative speaker has acquired 
grammatical morphemes such as past tense or the definite article in any 
completive sense at the time when these first appear in the repertoire of 
linguistic items. Even when a speaker starts using these forms consistently and 
correctly, we are not at all justified in stating that these morphemes have been 
acquired once and for all. As the results of much research has shown (for 
overviews, see Meisel 1987, von Stutterheim and Klein 1987), non-native 
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speakers may develop early systems for use of the past tense which are entirely 
consistent but which are limited to only certain contexts or which are quite 
different from the uses of these grammatical morphemes by native speakers 
(see also Huebner 1983). 
Some subtle uses of the past tense, e.g., in conditionals and in contexts of 
politeness, are probably not mastered even by native speakers until several 
years after some other uses of the tense appear regularly.4 Uses of the article 
in generics and with complex noun phrases such as gerunds and compounds, 
especially those of more than two elements, are surely quite late to develop, if 
at all, in some native and non-native speakers. In fact, one can assume that the 
rules for article use with complex noun phrases remain highly variable for 
many speakers throughout their lifetime. 
The view of language as a set of grammatical items is opposed by 
theories of language such as that of Hymes (1974), who sees language as a 
"system of systems" (p. 153) organizing "the multiple relations between 
linguistic means and social meaning'' (p. 31). Thus learning a language requires 
learning items as parts of a system, and learning the systems in the context of 
each other, rather than as isolated entities. In a similar vein, Canale and Swain 
(1980), elaborating on Hymes' (1972) notion of communicative competence, 
describe knowledge of a language as a set of competencies which must be 
learned as much as skills as discrete items. On this theoretical foundation, 
functionalist approaches to second language research have been developed, in 
which the starting point of investigation is not only a set of linguistic items, but 
also a set of communicative functions, making the analysis multidimensional 
in the sense of Long and Sa to (1984). 
Considering the fact that a native speaker's competence in a language 
can increase over time and the fact that an individual's phonological and 
grammatical systems are variable (Labov 1972) and subject to change at 
different points in one's life, we can see language not as a static system of 
systems, but as a dynamic system of interacting systems. From this perspective, 
4 The Rumelhart and McClelland (1986) PDP model of past tense acquisition starts from the 
assumption of past tense acquisition as a unitary phenomenon learned on the basis of present 
tense forms. It is therefore unable to model the fact that different lexical forms and different 
functions of the past tense morpheme are not all learned at the same time. This type of model 
can therefore not aid in developing explanations for the mechanisms of FLA or SLA diffusion 
of any kind. Chomsky's models also suffer from this shortcoming. 
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language may be viewed as a fluid entity with shifting boundaries. In this 
sense, interlanguage is parallel to other forms of language and can be described 
in the same sorts of terms, as in the work of Beebe (1980, 1984) and the 
Dickersons (L.J. Dickerson 1975, W.B. Dickerson 1976). 
Even more radically, language can be described as essentially a dynamic 
process involving communication between at least two people (in the "default" 
case, the two individuals would be one person and an imagined audience, 
which might even be that very person). From this perspective, coherence 
devices and exchanges involving several utterances become an important locus 
of investigation, and constructs such as negotiation of meaning and discourse 
processes might be seen as central to the explanation of observed linguistic 
phenomena. 
In yet another conception, Ladefoged (1980: 496) describes a language as 
"the social institution that permits formalized communication between 
individuals." From this vantage point, a language is a social and a cultural 
possession (Hymes 1974, Labov 1972, Milroy and Milroy 1985). As Labov 
(1981) has speculated, it may be impossible to ever truly "possess" a language 
other than the first language since lexical exceptions to rules seem to be learned 
from parents' speech. Such an explanation might also be relevant to the 
findings of Coppieters (1987) on the variable acquisition of meta-rules of 
grammar and appropriateness by adult learners of French as a second 
language. Coppieters' finding that fluent adult non-native speakers of French 
do not give the same explanations for rules as native speakers may be evidence 
that adult non-natives are not privy to certain kinds of information in the 
native speech community which are accessed primarily in childhood. In one 
sense, a language is what any native-born child in a given speech community 
knows. 
In another sense, the definition of language can be broadened beyond 
what a 5- or 6-year-old child knows, or beyond what anyone knows at any 
given time. It could be said that what a child knows is not (yet) language, or 
not fully language, or that what an individual knows is only part of language. 
From these differing perspectives, language can be seen as quite essentially 
open-ended, and influenced by increasing literacy and other cultural effects, 
rather than being a closed set of items or structures. On first glance, this view 
of language as open-ended may seem diametrically opposed to the view of 
language expressed in Chomsky's works as essentially grammar: 
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the central concept throughout is "grammar," not "language." The 
latter is derivative, at a higher level of abstraction from actual neural 
mechanisms; correspondingly, it raises new problems. It is not clear 
how important these are, or whether it is worthwhile to try to settle 
them in some principled way. (Chomsky 1981: 4) 
However, Chomsky (1981: 7-8) explicitly counters those who claim that 
his view of language is too restrictive: 
[I]t is hardly to be expected that what are called "languages" or 
"dialects" or even "idiolects" will conform precisely or perhaps even 
very closely to the systems determined by fixing the parameters of UG. 
This could happen only under idealized conditions that are never 
realized in fact in the real world of heterogeneous speech communities. 
Furthermore, each actual "language" will incorporate a periphery of 
borrowings, historical residues, inventions, and so on, which we can 
hardly expect to-and indeed would not want to-incorporate within a 
principled theory of UG. For such reasons as these, it is reasonable to 
suppose that UG determines a set of core grammars and that what is 
actually represented in the mind of an individiual even under the 
idealization to a homogeneous speech community would be a core 
grammar with a periphery of marked elements and constructions. 
Viewed against the reality of what a particular person may have inside 
his head, core grammar is an idealization. From another point of view, what a 
particular person has inside his head is an artifact resulting from the interplay 
of many idiosyncratic factors, as contrasted with the more significant reality of 
UG (an element of shared biological endowment) and core grammar (one of 
the systems derived by fixing the parameters of UG in one of the permitted 
ways). 
Those who work from these varied perspectives are trying to describe 
and explain different phenomena, though perhaps all under the umbrella term 
language. As a consequence, the type of explanation or theory of language 
learning in each case is bound to vary substantially. At the same time, while 
each group of researchers may have different research questions, their different 
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perspectives are not necessarily incompatible or even fundamentally opposed. 
Indeed, there seems to be no a priori reason that, e.g.,· functionalist and 
grammatical perspectives on language cannot be seen as complementary, each 
contributing useful insights to the construction of language learning theory. 
Still, the pursuit of competing explanations and theories seems to be 
such an elemental part of the conduct of research that we can expect opposing 
positions to continue to assert themselves in SLA and for debates to rage in all 
quarters. Indeed, if they did not, I fear that much productive research would 
come to a standstill. Lass (1980:4) reminds us that: 
one of the main ways that progress comes about is by criticism, 
which is well served by destru<;:tion or attempted destruction. H a totally 
negative assessment causes the babies to be thrown out with the bath-
water, this is no great loss; if the babies are really worth keeping and 
raising to maturity, someone is bound to fish them out again. (As long 
as we retain a sense of tradition, and are not too hard-nosed about 
discarding apparently 'refuted' or 'superseded' theories.) 
Conclusion 
According to Selinker and Lamendella (1981:202): 
[T]he understanding achieved by any field is strictly dependent on 
the metatheoretical perspective from which questions are asked and 
answered. Different perspectives attack the same problem based on 
different goals, each perspective considers different evidence, inteprets 
the same evidence differently, applies different research methodologies, 
and (as a result) arrives at idiosyncratic conclusions. We believe that the 
simultaneous applications of mutliple perspectives to an area of 
investigation is advantageous. However, this advantage will be lost 
when they are dealt with as producing competing theories of the same 
sort rather than as complementary alternatives of different sorts. Each 
perspective has advantages others lack, while at the same time 
embodying disadavantages in classical trade-off fashion. The major 
constraint on which perspective(s) a field should employ is that· the 
perspective(s) chosen must be appropriate for the goals which motivate 
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the endeavor. 
A phenomenon is explained when certain knowledgeable individuals, 
"experts" in the field in which the phenomenon is typically investigated, agree 
that it is explained. Therefore, the criterion for explanation of a phenomenon 
depends quite basically on what the phenomenon is and on who is doing the 
evaluating of the explanation (Achinstein 1971). Different evaluators have 
different requirements for explanations to the extent that they are interested in 
different research questions. Even if they are working in the same research 
environment, two investigators may not agree on exactly which phenomenon 
or aspect of a phenomenon is to be explained. To the extent that they have 
~fferent perceptions of what it is that they are investigating, researchers are 
unlikely to agree on the type and depth of explanation that is necessary in a 
given case. As Hornstein and Ughtfoot (1981:9) note: 
The question of what constitues a valid explanation can arise only in 
the context of some problem for which there is no self-evident solution. 
Hence in any domain there is an intimate relation between th~ way in 
which a problem is conceived and the kinds of explanation that one 
should offer. 
Thus, explanations vary according to the nature and the specificity of the 
phenomenon under investigation and according to the expectations of those 
seeking explanations. Moreover, it is the investigators in a field who determine 
the phenomenon which is to be explained, i.e., the nature and specificity of the 
phenomenon of investigation. In the field of language acquisition, a linguist, 
who is primarily interested in language, might be satisfied only with a unified 
theory of language learning and language change, while a psychologist, whose 
primary interest is cognition rather than language, will probably not be 
satisfied with an explanation that does not refer to neural mechanisms. One 
whose research environment is sentence grammar may be quite interested in 
interlanguage explanations having to do with canonical word order, while a 
person who investigates discourse will find these kinds of explanations 
unconvincing, uninteresting, even trivial. 
As a result of differing preconceptions and goals, it is very difficult to 
find cases in which a large group of researchers will agree entirely about 
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exactly what has been observed in a given experiment, muc? l~ss about how a 
phenomenon can best be described or explained. Thus, explanations in 
different fields of investigation tend to be either confined to a narrowly defined 
phenomenon and agreed upon by a small circle of experts, or else quite general 
and widely accepted but short-lived. A field advances by changing its 
investigative perspectives-e.g., by increasing its database or asking new 
questions-and by refining explanations based on its changing investigative 
perspectives. As Selinker and Lamendella (1981:218) remind us, theoretical 
advances in interlanguage studies 11Will depend first on the character of the 
meta theoretical stance [i.e., the investigative perspective] in terms of which one 
identifies relevant data, and most importantly interprets these .data as evidence 
validating one or another theoretical position." 
The SLA field has borrowed much from the related disciplines of 
linguistics and psychology in building explanations for interlanguage 
phenomena. In many cases, the borrowed terms and constructs have brought 
along with them all the connotations of the other field. Sometimes these 
imports greatly increase the explanatory power of a theory in the borrowing 
discipline, but not infrequently at a <:ost in terms of clarity or precision. Some 
homegrown terms also suffer from a similar kind of ambiguity or vagueness. 
New research should build on previous research, and improve upon it, 
continuing to refine the terms and constructs of the discipline. As the field of 
SLA advances, it should continue to expand its data base and to reexamine 
data previously collected in the context of current thinking. An increased effort 
to replicate previous studies can also help to clarify apparently inconsistent 
findings and to pinpoint the source of any differences in findings which are not 
artifacts of the methodologies employed. 
In seeking clarity and replicability, researchers in the field will want to 
describe the pre-existing biases that they bring to their work in terms of careful 
statements of the background of the study and the exact phenomenon under 
investigation. In addition, methods and results need to be described in enough 
detail for replication and for a full understanding on the part of the reader of 
the results of the study. In discussion of results, careful attention should be 
paid to theoretical implications for the field at large and to other related lines of 
research. 
In the future of SLA research, we can expect a continuing growth and 
accumulation of data and of explanations for those data. Moreover, we can 
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expect the explanations to continue to broaden and to account for larger and 
larger portions of the data. We can anticipate more and more sophisticated 
modelling by computer, with continued importation of concepts and methods 
from psychology. Beyond this, it is hard to tell in what exact direction this 
exciting young field will go. Like a child growing, we cannot predict exactly 
how it will turn out, but it is fascinating to watch and to participate in some 
way in building its bright future. 
February 23, 1988; revised March 31 and May 1, 1988. Received August 8, 1988. 
Author's address for correspondence: 
Martha C. Pennington 
Department of English as a Second Language 
1890 East- West Road 
University of Hawai'i at Manoa 
Honolulu, HI 96812 
69 
70 MARTHA C. PENNINGTQN 
REFERENCES 
Achinstein, P. 1968, Concepts of Science. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 
Achinstein, P. 1971, Law and Explanation: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Anderson, F. Forthcoming, Pitch-accent and tune contour in Japanese-English 
inter language. University of Hawai'i Working Papers in Linguistics. 
Anderson, R. W. 1983, Transfer to somewhere. In Gass, S., & Selinker, L. (eds.), 
Language Transfer in Language Learning, Rowley, MA: Newbury House. 
Bailey, N., Madden, C., & Krashen, S. 1974, Is there a 11natural sequence" in 
adult second language learning? Language Learning 21:2, 235-243. 
Beebe, L. 1980, Sociolinguistic variation and style shifting in second language 
acquisition. Language Learning 30,433-447. 
Beebe, L. 1984, Myths about interlanguage phonology. Studies in Descriptive 
Linguistics, Vol. 13. In· S. Eliassen (ed.), Theoretical Issues in Contrastive 
Phonology. Heildelberg: Julius Groos Verlag, 51--62. 
Bley-Vroman, R. Forthcoming, The logical problem of foreign language 
learning. Linguistic Analysis. 
Bley-Vroman, R, & Chaudron, C. 1988, Review essay: A critique of Flynn's 
parameter setting model of second language acquisition. University of 
Hawai'i Working Papers in ESL 7:1,67-107. 
Briere, E. 1966, An investigation of phonological interference. Language 42:4, 
768-796. 
Bromberger, S. 1969. Science and the forms of ignorance. In E. Nagel, S. 
Bromberger, & A. Grunbaum, Observation in Theory and Science. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 45--67. 
Canale, M., & Swain, M. 1980, Theoretical bases of communicative approaches 
to second language teaching and testing. Applied Linguistics 1:1,1-47. 
Chomsky, N. 1981, Lectures on Government and Binding. Dordrecht: Foris. 
Chomsky, N., & Halle, M. 1968, The Sound Pattern of English. New York: 
Harper & Row. 
Coppieters, R. 1987, Competence differences between native and near-native 
speakers. Language 63:3,544-573. 
ExPLANATIONSFOR~RLANGUAGEPHENOMffiNA 
Crothers, J. 1978, Typology and universals of vowel systems. In J. H. Greenberg 
et al. (eds.), Universals of Human Language, Vol. 2, Phonology. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 93-152. 
Dickerson, L. J. 1975, The learner's interlanguage as a system of variable rules. 
TESOL Quarterly 9:3,401-408. -
Dickerson, W. B. 1976, The psycholinguistic unity of language learning and 
language change. Language Learning 26:2,215-231. 
Dulay, H., Burt M., & Krashen, S. 1982, Language Two. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Eberle, R., Kaplan, D., & Montague, R. 1969, Hempel and Oppenheim on 
explanation. Philosophy of Science 28, 418-428. 
Eckman, F. 1981, On the naturalness of interlanguage phonological rules. 
Language Learning 31:1, 195-216. 
Felix, S. 1985, More evidence on competing systems. Second Language Research 
1:1,47-72. 
Feyerabend, .P· 1965, Problems of empiricism. In R. G. Colodny (ed.), Beyond 
the Edge of Uncertainty. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Flege, J. E. 1980, Phonetic approximation in second language acquisition. 
Language Learning 30:1, 117-34. 
Flege, J. E. 1981, The phonological basis of foreign accent: A hypothesis. 
TESOL Quarterly 15:3, 443-445. 
Flynn, S. 1987, Contrast and construction in a parameter-setting model of 
second languae acquisition. Language Learning 37:1, 19-62. 
Gregg, K. R. 1984, Krashen's Monitor and Occam's razor. Applied Linguistics 
5:1,79-100. 
Griinbaum, A. 1969, Can we ascertain the falsity of a scientific hypothesis? In 
E. Nagel, S. Bromberger, & A. Grunbaum, Observation in Theory and 
Science. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 69-129. 
Hammarberg, B. 1984, Learnability and learner strategies in second language 
syntax and phonology. In K. Hyltenstam and M. Pienemann (eds.), 
Modelling and Assessing Second Language Development. Clevedon, Avon: 
Multilingual Matters. 
Hawkins, R. D., & Kandel, E. R. 1984, Is there a cell-biological alphabet for 
simple forms of learning? Psychological Review 91:3,375-391.-
71 
72 MARTHA C. PENNINGTON 
Hecht, B. F., & Mulford, R. 1982, The acquisition of a second language 
phonology: Interaction of transfer and developmental factors. Applied 
Psycholinguistics 3:2,313-328. 
Hempel, C. G., & Oppenheim, P. 1948, Studies in the logic of explanation. 
Philsophy of Science, 15, 135-175. 
Hornstein, N., & Lightfoot, D. 1981, Explanation in Linguistics. London: 
Longman. 
Huebner, T. 1983, A Longitudinal Analysis of The Acquisition of English. Ann 
Arbor, MI: Karoma. 
Hymes, D. 1972. On communicative competence. In J. Pride & J. Holmes, 
Sociolinguistics. Harmondswroth: Penguin Books. 
Hymes, D. 1974, Foundations in Sociolinguistics: An Ethnographic Approach. 
Phildelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Krashen, S.D. 1981, Second Language Acquisition and Second Language Learning. 
Oxford; Pergamon Press. 
Krashen, S. D. 1982, Principles and Practice in Second Language Acquisition. 
Oxford: Pergamon Press. 
Krashen, 5. 1985, The Input Hypothesis: Issues and Implications. New York: 
Longman. 
Krashen, S., & Terrell, T. 1983, The Natural Approach: Language Acquisition in the 
Classroom . San Francisco: Alemany Press. 
Kuhn, T. S. 1970, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Second Edition. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Labov, W. 1966, The Social Stratification of English in New York City. 
Washington, DC: Center for Applied Linguistics. 
Labov, W. 1981, Resolving the neogrammarian controversy. Language 57:2, 
267-308. 
Labov, W., & Labov, T. 1978, The phonetics of cat and mama. Language 54:4, 
816-852. 
Labov, W., Yaeger, D., & Steiner, R. 1972, A Quantitative Study of Sound Change 
in Progress. Vols. 1 & 2. Report on National Science Foundation Contract 
NSF-G5-3287. Philadelphia: The U.S. Regional Survey. 
Ladefoged, P. 1980, What are linguistic sounds made of? Language 56:3, 
485-502. 
EXPLANATIONSFOR~RLANGUAGEPHENOMENA 
Ladefoged, P. 1982, A Course in Phonetics. New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich. 
Lass, R. 1980, On Explaining Language Change. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Long, M. H., & Sato, C. 1984, Methodological issues in interlanguage studies: 
An interactionist perspective. In A. Davies, C. Criper & A. Howatt (eds.), 
Interlanguage. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 253-279. 
Macken, M., & Ferguson, C. 1981, Phonological universals in language 
acquisition. In H. Winitz (ed.), Native Language and Foreign Language 
Acquisition. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 379, 110-129. 
Major, R. 1987, A model for interlanguage phonology. In G. Ioup & S. 
Weinberger (eds.), Interlanguage Phonology. Rowley, MA: Newbury 
House. 
Meisel, J. 1987, Reference to past events and actions in the development of 
natural second language acquisition. In C. Pfaff (ed.), First and Second 
Language Acquisition Processes. Rowley, MA: Newbury House, 206-224. 
Milroy, J. 1982, Probing under the tip of the iceberg: Phonological 
normalisation and the shape of speech communities. InS. Romaine (ed.), 
Sociolinguistic Variation in Speech Communities. London: Arnold, 35-48. 
Milroy, J., & Milroy, L. 1985, Linguistic change, social network and speaker 
innovation. Journal of Linguistics 21, 339-384. 
Nagel, E. 1961, The Structure of Science. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. 
Nagel, E. 1969, Theory and observation. In E. Nagel, S. Bromberger, & A. 
Griinbaum, Observation in Theory and Science. Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 15-43. 
Ochs, E. 1979, Transcription as theory. In E. Ochs & B. Shieffelin (eds.), 
Developmental Pragmatics. New York: Acadelnic Press, 43-72. 
Pennington, M. C. 1987, Universals, prosody and SLA. Contributions and 
Challenges of SLA Research to Linguistic Theory. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University, July. 
Pennington, M. C. 1988, Acquisition of English short·a by Japanese speakers. 
Second Language Research Forum. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i, 
March. 
Peters, A. 1983, The Units of Language Acquisition. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
73 
74 MARTHA C. PENNINGTON 
Riney, T. J. 1987, The Interlanguage Phonology of Vietnamese English. 
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University. 
Romaine, S. 1982, Socio-Historical Linguistics: Its Status and Methodology. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rumelhart, D. E., & McClelland, J. L. 1986, On learning the past tenses of 
English verbs. In D. E. Rumelhart & J. L. McClelland and the PDP 
Research Group, Parallel Data Processing, Vol. 2, Psychological and 
Biological Models. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press,216-271. 
Sato, C. 1984, Phonological processes in second language acquisition: Another 
look at interlanguage syllable structure. Language Learning 34:1,43-57. 
Scheffler, I. 1963, The Anatomy of Inquiry. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
Selinker, L, & Lamendella, J. T. 1981, Updating the interlanguage hypothesis. 
Studies in Second Language Acquisition 3:2,201-220. 
Smullyan, R. M. 1961, Theory of Formal Systems. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Tarone, E. 1978, The phonology of interlanguage. In J. C. Richards (ed.), 
Understanding Second and Foreign Language Learning. Rowley, MA: 
Newbury House, 15-33. 
Terrell, T. 1987, The role of grammar instruction in beginning second/foreign 
language classes. Conference of Association of Teachers of English to 
Speakers of Other Languages, Miami, FL, April. 
Trefil, J. 1988, Phenomena, comment and notes, Smithsonian 18:10,34-38. 
Vendler, Z. 1967, Linguistics in Philosophy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press. 
Von Stutterheim, C., & Klein, W. 1987, A concept-oriented approach to second 
language studies. In C. Pfaff (ed.), First and Second Language Acquisition 
Processes. Rowley, MA: Newbury House, 191-205. 
Wickens, T. D. 1982, Models for Behavior: Stochastic Processes in Psychology. San 
Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company. 
Wode, H. 1976, Developmental sequences in naturalistic L2 acquisition. 
Working Papers on Bilingualism 11, 1-31. 
Wulf, W. A., Shaw, M., Hilfinger, P. N., & Flon, L. 1981, Fundamental 
Structures of Computer Science. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
